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Abstract. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) against small state 
performance along several dimensions including rule of law, 
human rights and economic efficiency factors not specified in the 
CIFP conflict-instability index. This is done by evaluating aspects 
of governance, specifically democracy, against stability and 
conflict. Variables relating to the governance of small states are 
then specified in order to lay out a framework for empirical 
analysis. Our results indicate that the determinants of governance 
in small developing states are not very different from those in 
developing countries. 
1. Introduction 
Governance as a concept has become increasingly important in economic, 
social and political debates and, despite extensive theoretical and 
empirical research on its impact and consequence for development, 
comparatively little is known about its determinants in general, and even 
more so in the case of small developing states. This chapter intends to 
fill some of that gap by conducting an evaluation of the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) against small state performance 
along several dimensions including rule of law, human rights and 
economic efficiency factors not specified in the CIFP conflict-instability 
index. In particular, we examine democracy against stability and conflict 
and then conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of governance 
for small developing states. We build on earlier work by Carment et al. 
(2006), which used somewhat contrasting cases together with statistical 
testing, and reported a number of findings about small island developing 
states (SIDS). As discussed in Carment et al. (2006), first, SIDS have 
specific and individual vulnerabilities related to their particular economic 
conditions, governance, international linkages and the environment. 
Second, in comparison to larger countries, where problems tend to be 
complex and multifaceted in nature, few SIDS have problems 
experienced in all areas listed above; conversely, challenges facing SIDS 
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tend to be more localised to specific policy areas. Weak SIDS are prone 
to low-level political instability and crime-related violence, but in most 
cases, such instability rarely leads to large-scale conflict. These findings 
suggest that SIDS in many cases could benefit from policy initiatives 
targeted at specific and well-defined problems that are not compounded 
by other risk factors. 
Carment et al. (2006) also found that, in comparing the Briguglio and 
Galea (2003) Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) with the CIFP conflict-
instability index, there are significant differences in the ways the 
methodologies evaluate both the risks faced by SIDS and the political 
and economic structures designed to mitigate those risks. For instance, 
scores for the 10 SIDS included in both Briguglio and Galea' s EVI and 
the CIFP risk index correlate at -0.54. However, when using a modified 
version of the CIFP instability risk index that includes lead indicators 
related to 'inherent' structural vulnerabilities, namely demographic 
stress, environmental stress, population heterogeneity, and human 
development, that correlation rises to -0.77. 
As will be shown in this chapter, the resilience of small developing states 
(SDS) in general, and SIDS specifically, should be understood in more 
than economic terms. It will be argued that there are key political and 
institutional features of SDS that help to mitigate those risks. To evaluate 
these claims, our current research has moved in two related but analytically 
distinct directions, namely a focus on fragile states and governance. Each 
employs its own set of indices, weightings and definitions. Both are related 
to, but distinct from, the original CIFP conflict and instability index which 
was used in previous testing. While initial testing allowed us to specify 
the correlates of instability within SIDS, in this chapter we expand our 
testing to encompass all small developing states (SDS). Initial results 
summarised in Appendix 2 show that there is a strong correlation between 
the Briguglio et al.' s Resilience Index and the CIFP. This is in due part 
because of the overlapping economic dimensions that are part of both. 
However, the CIFP governance index taps into other aspects of governance 
including rule of law, human rights, the capacity of the state to extract 
resources and the ability of the state to enforce contracts (see Appendix 3 
for a full list of indicators). 
There is wide variation within the literature regarding the definition of 
governance. Many attempts say more about those defining the term than 
the term itself. Some, such as the World Bank, focus on the economic 
aspects of governance; others, such as the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), draw more heavily upon the human 
security agenda for their definition. CIFP incorporates aspects of both 
economic governance and human security in its own operationalisation 
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of the term, along with considerations of political stability, the importance 
of which becomes clear in any study of fragile states. As in its definition 
of fragility, CIFP derives its definition of governance inductively, 
identifying the necessary components of functional government regimes 
and subsequently using structural data to measure their relative presence 
or absence in each state considered. In particular, CIFP identifies six 
core components of sound governance: peace and political stability; 
market and economic efficiency; rule of law; human rights; government 
transparency and accountability; and popular participation in democratic 
and political institutions. Deficiency along any one of these dimensions 
indicates the existence of some deficiency of governance in the state. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 evaluates aspects 
of resilience in the context of governance, especially democracy, stability 
and conflict. Section 3 examines the characteristics of governance of small 
states in order to lay out a framework for empirical analysis. Using the 
CIFP governance index, Section 4 considers the correlates of governance 
of small states using recent data. The final section puts forward some 
ideas for future research. 
2. Resilience, Vulnerability and Democracy 
The definition of good governance adopted in this chapter includes more 
than just functioning democratic institutions. However, understanding 
the relationship between democracy and resilience may provide some 
basic insights as to whether the former is a necessary precondition for 
effective growth and stability. Though a number of scholars maintain 
that democratic governance is associated with long-term peace and 
stability, the relationship between conflict and regime type is far more 
ambiguous. In other words, non-democratic but long-lasting regimes 
are sometimes found in states which have achieved a degree of economic 
and political stability. Certainly, the relationship between democracy 
and stability is not absolute. 
The history of sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial period is littered 
with examples of democratic regimes of varying strength that were 
overwhelmed by violence, and one need only consider the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, the recent civil war in Cote d'Ivoire, or the ongoing conflict 
in Sri Lanka, Colombia and Indonesia to find examples of violent civil 
conflict occurring in states featuring many aspects of democracy. In each 
case, any potential pacifying effects accruing from democratic 
governance were overwhelmed as a result of numerous processes 
ranging from failed economic transitions, to delegitimisation of reform 
movements, to the rise of ethno-nationalist movements. 
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Though some authors continue to support the hypothesis that 
democracy, when defined narrowly, is inherently peace inducing, the 
examples above suggest that, barring virtually tautological definitions, 
any correlation between democracy and civil peace is probabilistic in 
nature (Saideman et al., 2002). Ultimately, any peace-inducing effects 
provided by democratic institutions are heavily dependent on the 
presence of other factors as well (Vanhanen, 1990). 
One prominent theory suggests that the level of democracy is significant, 
with partial democracies, also referred to as semi-democracies, 
anocracies, intermediate regimes, or unconsolidated regimes, being less 
stable than either full democracies or well-entrenched autocracies 
(Huntington ,1968; Muller, 1985; Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; O'Donnell, 1996; 
Schmitter, 2004). There are a number of variations to this theory. 
Huntington (1968), among others, suggests that increased civil violence 
is an unfortunate by-product of the process of democratisation. Others 
argue that constant instability is not necessarily the result of 
democratisation, but simply a property of chronically-unstable minimal 
governments unable to generate a durable polity; such states differ 
fundamentally from both autocracies and democracies in their ability to 
manage social transformation without triggering abrupt political change 
(Gurr, 1974). 
Still others, such as Regan and Henderson (2002), maintain that partial 
democratic regimes tend to face greater threats from opposition groups 
than other types of states, given the inconsistent nature of popular 
participation in the state. Partial democracies relax restrictions on civil 
liberties to the extent that organised opposition groups can form, but 
maintain sufficient controls on government authority to deny meaningful 
participation to such groups. Unable to secure a legitimate role in policy 
formation, such groups may turn to more radical avenues of opposition, 
creating new threats to the governing regime in the process. The net 
result, argue Regan and Henderson, is an increased likelihood for 
government repression and internal violence in partial democracies, a 
phenomenon they refer to as the inverted "U" hypothesis. Mansfield 
and Snyder (1995) provide a cogent account of such effects at the 
interstate level. 
An alternative line of reasoning holds that democracy must be combined 
with relatively robust economic conditions in order to have a peace-
inducing effect. Drawing on the rich literature within the field of political 
science concerning the requirements of democracy that includes classical 
treatments by Kant ([1795], 2003), as well as more recent formulations 
by Lipset (1959) and Dahl (1989), such arguments have been referred to 
variously as the modernisation or development thesis. The creation of a 
220 
Small States, Resilience and Governance 
stable and peaceful polity requires both democratic institutions and a 
robust economy- the absence of either one leaves the states vulnerable 
to conflict. A number of writers have produced evidence in support of 
such a thesis. Hegre (2003) provides one recent example. In sum, there 
is a great deal of ambiguity on the question of whether, and to what 
extent, democracy is a prerequisite for effective economic development; 
indeed, it remains possible that democracy is in many instances an 
emergent property of certain types of economic development. While 
the literature review above suggests that democracy, nested within a 
broader framework of good governance, may indeed contribute to 
stabilisation, questions nonetheless remain. Within the context of SDS, 
what additional features of good governance are integral to small states? 
In other words, how are small developing states typically governed, 
and how do these patterns of governance contribute to -or in some cases 
limit-economic and political resilience? In the next section, we examine 
governance with regard to SDS. 
3. Governance and SDS 
Recent research has found a positive link between the quality of small 
state institutions and their historical links with the British Empire, their 
isolation from the rest of the world and their political unity (Anckar, 
2006; Srebrnik, 2004). With regard to historical ties, most small states 
that were once colonies of the British Empire tend to be more democratic 
than other colonies, while Portugal and Spain's colonies tend to have 
the worst performance (Anckar, 2004). This idea relates to the diffusion 
thesis, where democratic patrons, especially those with a parliamentary 
system, replicated their preference for institutional design, sometimes 
by force, within their colonies. Also, as Huntington (1968) points out, 
the length of the colonial period also makes a difference. Indeed, 
"whereas of short-time colonies a majority are non-democracies, of long-
time colonies a majority are democracies" (Anckar, 2004: 219). 
Geographical factors are also of prime importance. Where a small state 
is located near a regional power that has an authoritarian regime, it is 
more likely to emulate the powerful neighbour (Commonwealth 
Consultative Group, 1985). Likewise, regional affiliation may have an 
impact, where African and Pacific small states are surrounded by 
authoritarian regimes. Finally (and this is the factor often cited as the 
most significant one), small island states in particular tend to be more 
democratic than small non-ISland states (Anckar, 2006). The underlying 
argument is that their remoteness isolates and, in some way, immunises 
them from spillover effects of conflicts in neighbouring countries, thus 
contributing to their ability to implement and maintain democratic 
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regimes (Ott, 2000; Carment et al., 2006). At the same time, small islands 
are increasingly becoming the targets of drug and arms traffickers, 
especially when they are located near a continental state (Commonwealth 
Consultative Group, 1985: 25). 
Another potential factor contributing to the quality of institutions in 
small states is their social cohesion (Read, 2001: 17). They are said to 
form a homogenous political community, a prerequisite of democracy 
(Rustow, 1967; Powell, 1982). Polarisation in party politics is largely 
absent in small states (Sutton, 1987) and inhabitants' identities are usually 
almost identical to the identity of the state itself (Lowenthal, 1987: 29). 
This concerted political harmony finds its source in the necessity of 
fostering in-group solidarity against constant external threats. As a 
manifestation of this communal bond and political rectitude, 
parliamentary elections or referendums are often found to be illustrative 
(Alapuro et al., 1985: 23). Similarly, significant vertical as well as 
horizontal inequalities seem to be less likely in small states (Sutton, 2007; 
Streeten, 1993), thus greatly reducing the risk of internal strife. However, 
even if group conflicts are rare, once they break out, communal animosity 
may persist for a long time, resulting in a breakdown of social unity. 
This is especially true if, contrary to Lijphart' s (1977) assumption, power 
parity exists among only a few social groups. Accordingly, power 
imbalance is found to be conducive to democracy (Dahl, 1971). 
One might wonder if positive effects related to state size could over the 
long run outweigh the negative effects. In the end, it may come down to 
the fact that many small states have recently declared their independence 
and thus have relatively immature institutions. Most of the literature on 
small states has dealt with foreign policy and economic issues, while 
the identification of the specific factors explaining the quality of their 
domestic political institutions has been largely neglected. Indeed, 
although some work has been done on historical and geographical 
determinants and on the dependent variable - governance - most of our 
claims remain hypothetical. 
Overall, a preliminary assessment of plausible explanatory variables 
suggests that, as Baldacchino and Bertram (2007) note, hybridisation is 
a common feature of small states. More precisely, when the analysis 
moves from the macro to the micro unit level, dichotomous forces arise, 
which lead to the development of the vulnerability/ resilience paradigm 
elaborated by Briguglio et al. (2006). Their assumption is that the origin 
ot vulnerabilities is exogenous and mostly determined by international 
economic considerations, whereas the capacity to adapt is internal and 
dominated by socio-psychological traits. However, some exogenous 
forces may increase small-state capacity to effectively respond and, as 
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noted above, inversely endogenous elements may well exacerbate an 
already precarious situation (Baldacchino and Bertram, 2007). Ultimately, 
research must focus on the relative magnitude of factors that are either 
conducive or detrimental to good governance, while trying to integrate 
previous findings, a task that is too often disregarded (Sutton, 2007: 3; 
Lowenthal, 1987: 34; Amstrup, 1976: 176). 
Small states are confronted by a unique combination of inherent 
economic vulnerabilities resulting from their scarce resources (land, 
primary commodities, labour, capital and entrepreneurship) and small 
domestic markets (Briguglio, 1995; Armstrong and Read, 2002; Selwyn, 
1975). Over-specialisation, dependence on external trade and capital, 
constant intrusion of the state in the domestic economy and limited 
capacity to deliver public goods are themes common to many SDS 
(Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank, 2000). In others words, small 
states face serious constraints in their economic development that tend to 
erode the quality of their institutions, with respect to the level of corruption, 
regulatory practices and government effectiveness. At the same time, these 
constraints are to some extent counter-balanced by specific context factors. 
For instance, the fact that small-state inhabitants, by their very nature, are 
closely related to one another, when coupled with the social necessity to 
survive, can have a variety of impacts on the state, potentially 
strengthening the rule of law, reducing political instability and giving the 
citizenry a voice to hold political leaders accountable. 
First, the industrial base of many small states is confined to one or two 
dominant sectors. Their narrow domestic markets minimise their ability 
to reach economies of scale, which have long been identified by the 
economic orthodoxy as a prerequisite for a diversified industrial 
structure. Thus, industrialisation as an engine of growth is a phenomenon 
largely absent in small states. Given that theories of modernisation, 
dependence and capitalism emphasise a positive association between 
economic development and the practice of democratic politics, small 
states would be expected to have poor governance practices. 
Although divergences exist concerning the specific dynamics at play, 
the main argument of those proponents linking economic development 
and democracy is that manufacture-based industrialisation leads to the 
emergence of an educated, organised, middle-income working class 
which acts as a counter-power against traditional elites (Lerner, 1958; 
Lipset, 1959; Schumpeter, 1947). The central idea is that industrialisation 
favours the diffusion of centres of power in a society, creating favourable 
conditions for the emergence and consolidation of democracy and good 
governance practices (Dahl, 1971; Vanhanen, 1984). Accordingly, it 
suggests that small-state institutions are expected to be highly centralised. 
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For instance, there is a preference for monopolistic positions (Sutton, 
2007), where few powerful groups with vested interests co-opt the 
political agenda, leaving the concerns of the majority aside and inducing 
parochial behaviours from political representatives (Payne, 1984). 
Moreover, extreme specialisation is detrimental to inter-industry linkages 
(Armstrong and Read, 2002; Selwyn, 1975: 78), that are in turn presumed 
to foster peaceful and consensual behaviour by raising the cost of conflict 
(Humphreys, 2002). 
That being said, an assessment of the degree of diversification in small 
states might reveal a contrasting picture when disaggregated (Brookfield, 
1975). For instance, inhabitants of small states often have more than one 
source of income at a given time that may also change over time; an 
aspect of the labour market not easily captured in macroeconomic 
statistics (Baldacchino and Bertram, 2007: 4). Beyond the resulting 
methodological problems, such a fact implies that individuals have 
interests in multiple dimensions of society and thus contribute to its 
socio-economic diversity to a greater extent than conventional political 
economic theory might predict. In combination with the direct access to 
governing elites, ordinary citizens of small states may enjoy a remarkable 
degree of democratic voice (Farrugia, 1993). Indeed, even in situations 
of low economic diversification we would expect that small-state leaders 
are held responsible for their actions, and that there is place for divergent 
voices and accountability. 
Conversely, strategic flexibility and societal intimacy may prove 
detrimental at the institutional level. Lowenthal (1987: 40) stresses that 
"where everyone is related, personal involvement in public affairs is 
inevitable and nepotism unavoidable." Sutton (1987: 16-17) also argues 
that "in small societies it is relatively easier for a determined, 
unscrupulous individual. .. to dominate all or most aspects of the 
country's life". This argument points to the idea that influence is a two-
way street: if citizens can easily influence policies through personal 
contact with high-ranking civil servants, a despotic leader can also 
quickly modify or reverse emerging institutional patterns of 
accountability using the same informal networks. 
Second, many small states are dependent on the export of natural 
resources to few destinations (Amstrup, 1976; Commonwealth 
Consultative Group, 1985). On this subject, the literature on resource 
rents tends to converge toward the recognition of their negative effects 
on the quality of institutions (Luciani, 1987; Karl, 1997). The main 
argument is what Ross (2004) has called the taxation effect. When the 
central government extracts the majority of its revenue from non-tax 
sources-tariff and non-tariff barriers-it tends to function in autarchy, 
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without consulting the population. Thus, corruption becomes endemic 
and mismanagement of public funds a recurrent problem (Ascher, 1999). 
Moreover, small states generally lack sufficient domestic capital to 
finance their industrial projects and have limited access to international 
credit (Commonwealth Consultative Group, 1985). Therefore, most of 
the capital inputs come as foreign direct investments or aid. In the case 
of the former, Brautigam and Woolcock (2001: 2) note that "investors 
seem to be indifferent to the quality of their [small state] institutions," a 
common situation in the natural resources sector, given that assets are 
fixed. When multinational firms have to operate in an inhospitable 
environment, they will likely buy off the loyalty of the strongest party 
or group in order to secure their investment (Reno, 2004). Rents accruing 
from such corruption tend to reinforce existing social cleavages by 
empowering one group to the detriment of others and, more importantly, 
helping to perpetuate repressive regimes (see our assessment of the 
Solomon Islands in Carment et al., 2006). 
The same can be said about aid. Collier and Dollar (1999) acknowledge 
the absence of an association between aid and policy in small states, in 
spite of the effectiveness of aid being positively correlated to the quality 
of institutions. Brautigam and Woolcock (2001: 5) even advance that a 
"high level of aid intensity has been correlated with poor quality of [small] 
state institutions." Thus, it is fair to assume that political elites adopt rent-
seeking behaviours, where external funds are used in a discretionary and 
inefficient way for purposes other than those originally planned. 
Again, a more nuanced picture emerges when the scope of the analysis 
is broadened. Contrary to oil rent-seeking states, many smali states 
have diversified their sources of revenues by expanding their fiscal 
base through personal income grandisement (Brookfield, 1975; 
Katzenstein, 1985). However, it is far from obvious that income taxes 
represent a substantial source of revenue for governments of small 
states. If it is marginal, the government may well ignore the needs and 
demands of citizens, preferring to simply reduce or erase their tax rate. 
However, such a decision may result in weakened governing 
institutions, particularly if the government tends to respond to the 
needs of those providing the government's substantive revenue streams 
while neglecting the needs of most citizens. If some groups benefit 
from preferential rates (e.g., fiscal paradise), it may well create clashes 
between the population and the governing elites and nourish political 
instability. 
Ott (2000) makes an interesting point by considering the possibility that, 
although small states are vulnerable to external influence, these 
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influences might have a positive impact by pressuring governing elites 
to democratise. For instance, political conditions can be imposed on the 
attribution of aid or the terms of entry into a regional bloc (Ethier, 2003; 
Campling, 2006). In case of recalcitrant actors, a direct foreign 
intervention can even be considered. However, as to the last point, the 
debate is still open since the academic community essentially deals with 
counter-factual cases, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Third, in small states, the central government is often the single largest 
employer (Farrugia, 1993: 225). With limited employment opportunities 
and access to capital, competition for state revenues is fierce, a situation 
that can foster political instability (Cohen, 1987). Moreover, the resulting 
patron-client relationships between the government and inhabitants 
considerably reduce the capacity of the latter to express points of view 
that diverge from those of the political elites, since those same elites 
control their wages (Sutton, 1987). Inevitably, such governmental 
pervasiveness raises the question as to whether state institutions, 
including the judicial system, are in fact impartial, given that senior 
officials and judges are likely subject to direct pressure from political 
leaders (Lowenthal, 1987: 43). 
Caution must be used in interpreting the implications of state presence 
in the economy and society as a whole from proxies such as public 
expenditure. For instance, a substantial share of public expenditure might 
take the form of transfer payments from government to households and 
producers (Katzenstein, 1985: 55). Also, as previously mentioned, 
individuals may have more than one source of income. An individual 
may hold a position in the public administration while running a retail 
shop, leaving some room for an independent opinion on specific issues. 
Fourth, the capacities of small states are considerably restrained by 
international market price volatility and high per capita cost of public 
infrastructures for which, regardless of size, a minimum outlay is required 
of all states. Small state capacity is further reduced by environmental 
vulnerabilities. Such burdens weaken institutions and, if combined with 
centralised government, will likely result in increased popular dissent. If 
political elites are unable to meet citizen demands and still want to hold 
their position of power, one remaining option is to use repressive methods, 
with the consequent adverse effects on the prospect of democratic 
institutions. In contrast to such reasoning, however, small states usually 
have low or no defence expenditures; they also tend to have adequately 
fmanced health and education sectors (Armstrong and Read, 200:2). On 
one hand, with the absence of military forces, even if conflict emerges, 
state repression should be limited to a low intensity. On the other hand, a 
lack of the power or resources necessary to contain popular unrest may 
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ensure that, once begun, the conflict becomes intractable That said 
however, historically the military elites have often played a crucial role 
when present, more often than not to the detriment of the democratisation 
process, representing a viable alternative force able to replace the 
govermnent (Katzenstein, 1985: 138). Without such a group, democratic 
institutions are more likely to persist and flourish. 
Finally, to mitigate the adverse effects of openness and volatility, many 
small states have created stabilisation funds and a public investment 
bank, as well as limited wage and price increases (Katzenstein, 1985). 
Thus, at first glance, small states' limited capacity might not be a problem 
after all. For example, the management of stabilisation funds is well-
known, especially in developing countries, to be an opaque process that 
often goes hand in hand with allegations of corruption. 
In sum, small developing states are in important ways distinct from 
larger, more diverse states. Their limited area, relative isolation, and 
homogenous social structure all have a significant impact on the 
economic and political life of SDS. These factors result in significant 
structural weaknesses with the potential to significantly constrain 
economic performance; in turn, sub-optimal economic development may 
impair or even undermine institutions of democratic governance. 
However, such weaknesses are in many cases mitigated, if not fully 
counter-balanced, by the presence of numerous factors that also stem 
from small states' distinctive situations. Given the contextual nature of 
these factors, they are often neglected by conventional economic models. 
With these considerations in mind, we turn now to the quantitative data 
in an attempt to identify some determinants of governance for SDS, and 
to specify to what extent these determinants differ from those found 
among all developing states. 
4. Quantitative Analysis of Governance 
The idea that weak institutions and limited capacity pose major obstacles 
to growth and development is now commonly accepted; for example, 
the World Bank views the fight against corruption and the achievement 
of good governance as being essential components to its mission to 
eradicate poverty. During the first three decades after the Second World 
War, as development economics emerged as a separate sub-field, the 
development literature did not pay much attention to governance, 
focusing instead on growth and on poverty reduction. It was not until 
the 1980s that governance started being emphasised in development 
circles. As is lhe case wilh slate fragility, however, governance is also a 
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concept that is hard to define; different definitions exist and most of 
them include notions of institutions, rules, traditions and values by which 
authority, legitimacy and capacity of a state are exercised. 
Analysts use different definitions depending on the nature and objectives 
of their studies, with a focus on outcomes, namely decision making, 
implementation and potential obstacles that can prevent the latter. 
Different definitions are thus captured by measures such as the rule of 
law, corruption, bureaucratic quality, expropriation risk, political 
instability and political risk ratings, to name a few. For example, 
Kaufmann et al. (2005, 2006) measure governance along six dimensions, 
namely voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption. The different indicators are constructed by means 
of an unobserved components methodology and they are based on 
reports from businesses, citizens and expert opinion; the numbers range 
from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values reflect better governance ratings. 
Kaufmann et al. (2006) in the same vein, define governance as "the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised 
for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in 
authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the 
government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound 
policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them." Interestingly, 
and of direct relevance to this chapter, goal number 8 of the Millennium 
Development Goals, which is to develop a global partnership for 
development, includes commitments to good governance, development 
and poverty reduction at both the national and international level (target 
12) and addressing the special needs of landlocked countries and small 
island developing states (target 14). 
The CIFP project has also devoted considerable attention to the issue of 
governance and defines it along the following six categories: democratic 
participation, government and economic efficiency, accountability, 
human rights, political stability and rule of law (see Appendix 3 for a 
detailed breakdown of each category). Each of these sub-categories is 
calculated by averaging scores assigned to different indicators that reflect 
the latter and range from 1 to 9, with lower scores indicating better 
governance. 
The following paragraphs will focus mostly on the CIFP data, but it is 
important to point out that the CIFP and World Bank data correlate at 
around 90%, and this holds whether all developing countries or a smaller 
sample of SDS are considered. Appendix 1 provides a list of SOS for 
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which data exists on some of the main variables considered in this 
chapter; due to limited data availability, some of the countries will 
inevitably drop out of the analysis, depending on the variables that are 
chosen. 
Table 1 compares the performance of these countries relative to other 
countries along the different dimensions of governance using CIFP data. 
A number of points stand out from the Table. First, developed countries 
have relatively smaller scores, judging by the difference in scores when 
one goes from columns 1 to 2. Second, looking at average scores, SDS 
do better overall when compared to developing countries, extremely 
well in terms of /1 political stability", but not so well under /1 democratic 
participation", and /1 government and economic efficiency". This again 
illustrates the uniqueness of SDS, and while the reasons for this are 
alluded to in the above summary, they definitely deserve further 
investigation beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Table 1 
Governance in SDS vs Other Countries using CIFP Data (2002-2006) 
Governance Indicators All SDS Developing 
Countries 
Democratic Participation 5.56 5.96 5.98 
Government and Economic Efficiency 5.11 5.45 5.49 
Accountability 4.97 5.50 4.34 
Human Rights 4.88 5.34 4.04 
Political Stability 3.97 4.24 2.74 
Rule of Law 5.59 5.98 5.18 
Average score 5.00 5.39 4.61 
Note: Based on authors' calculations. Developing countries exclude all OECD countries; 
Small Developing States (SDS) exclude Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Monaco. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is an extensive 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, that has examined the effects 
of governance on economic growth (and, by implication, on poverty 
reduction). Although governance and institutions did not receive the 
attention that they were due (in retrospect) when development 
economics emerged as a separate sub-field, it has long been recognised 
that they were important. Recent contributions (for example, by North 
in 1990) have placed institutions, in the form of property rights and 
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enforcement of contracts, at the centre of development. Statistical studies 
based on large-sample cross-country analysis have thereafter, by and 
large, found support for the argument that governance matters in 
economic development (see for example Barro, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Knack 
and Keefer, 1995). Barro (1991), using data for 98 countries over the period 
1960-85, finds that growth rates and measures of political stability are 
positively related and, according to him, this may reflect secure property 
rights; Mauro (1995) finds that corruption, through its negative impact 
on investment, reduces growth, and that the results hold even when 
endogeneity is taken into account; using indicators for property rights, 
Knack and Keefer (1995) find that the effects of property rights on growth 
are much larger than previously established. All these papers have 
thoroughly investigated the relationship between governance and 
growth but, as far as we know, few have investigated the issue 
specifically with regard to SDS. 
The partial scatterplots in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are quite informative in 
this regard. Both graphs use the CIFP governance data and growth of 
real Gross Domestic Product averaged over the 2002-2005 period. Figure 
1 shows the partial relationship between governance and growth, 
controlling for initial income, for all developing countries. There is 
virtually no relationship between governance and growth, given the 
relatively flat line; in fact, the governance coefficient related to this 
scatterplot is not significant. This finding is at odds with the findings by 
Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995) discussed in the previous 
paragraph. 
Figure 1 
Growth vs Governance, 2002-2005: Developing Countries 
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More importantly, however, the same exercise yields a completely 
different result in the case of SDS, as can be seen in Figure 2. The 
regression line is negative in this case (even though the regression 
coefficient on governance is still not significant at the 5% level). 
Obviously, the results from Figures 1 and 2 are likely to change when 
more complex models and different time periods are considered. Despite 
its simplicity, this exercise shows that SDS have potentially unique 
characteristics that require further investigation. 
Figure 2 
Growth vs Governance, 2002-2005: Small Developing States 
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Even if there is a consensus that governance (as defined by CIFP) 
generally matters for development, and if it is in fact true that good 
governance has a positive impact on growth and development, the 
natural question that one should ask is why some countries are 
characterised by good governance while others are not. In the case of 
SDS, this is a question that remains largely unanswered, though the 
present authors attempted to survey the dominant views. Furthermore, 
the definition of governance that one adopts will determine the 
independent variables that one should control for. 
As mentioned above, different studies have discussed certain aspects of 
whdl one woulJ com.iJe1 d::. rep1e::.e11Li11g gove111a11ce, fo1 example, Lhe 
extent of corruption, the impact of property rights, or political stability. 
In the empirical analysis that follows, the aggregate indicator of 
governance constructed by CIFP will be used as the dependent variable 
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and construed to be influenced by economic, cultural and political factors 
(as identified in the review of the literature in the previous section). In 
particular, the independent variables that are considered are the 
following: 
1. The level of economic development measured as the logarithm of 
GDP per capita, averaged over the previous five years (1997-2001) to 
mitigate against reverse causality. This variable is denoted by 
log(gdppc9701) and follows from the idea that there is a positive 
relationship between economic development and the practice of 
democratic politics. In fact, as can be extrapolated from Table 1 above, 
richer countries tend to have better governance scores, on average. 
2. Openness to trade, averaged over the period 1997-2001 (trade9701) 
is measured by the sum of imports and exports to Gross Domestic 
Product, and is a standard measure of openness widely used in the 
literature. It takes into account the possibility that external factors 
may pressure governments to democratise (Ott, 2000). 
3. Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation averaged over the period 1960-80 
(denoted by elf6080) is obtained from the La Porta et al. (1999) dataset. 
We also have a different version for 1985 ( elf85) by Roeder (2001). La 
Porta et al. (1999) find that ethnolinguistically heterogeneous 
countries tend to have inferior government performance. 
4. A dummy variable for countries with the British legal system (British) 
is also obtained from the La Porta et al. (1999) dataset since, according 
to Anckar (2004), former colonies of the British Empire tend to be 
more democratic than other colonies. 
One could consider additional controls, but given the number of 
observations, especially for SDS, this would exhaust valuable degrees of 
freedom. Because of data limitations, we can only consider the variables 
that we feel are the most important based on our assessment of the existing 
literature, leaving the consideration of further variables for future research. 
Our main objective, once again, is to see whether SDS behave differently 
when compared with other countries; in other words, are the determinants 
of governance different for this group of countries? 
Table 2 shows the results when the above model is estimated using 
ordinary least squares and after applying White's correction for 
heteroskedastity. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates for the sample 
of developing countries. The only difference between the two columns 
is that we tried the two ethnolinguistic fractionalisation indices described 
above for sensitivity. 
As expected, the level of development is highly significant and with the 
right sign, indicating that the level of development is associated with 
good governance. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Governance 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) 
Developing Countries 
Constant 9.75** 10.21** 
(-15.70) (-18.67) 
log(gd ppc9701) -0.56** -0.54** 
(-6.94) -7.27 
trade9701 -0.01* -0.01** 
(-1.62) (-3.00) 
Elf6080 0.12 -
-(0.39) 
Elf85 - -0.55** 
(-1.87) 
British -0.55** -0.33* 
(-2.96) (-1.76) 
N 106 120 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 0.41 
F-Stat 24.89 20.03 
(3) (4) 
SDS 
8.87** 9.26** 
(-6.22) (-6.89) 
-0.44** -0.43** 
(-2.68) (-2.42) 
-0.01 -0.01** 
(-1.25) (-1.99) 
0.29 -
-(0.52) 
- -0.11 
(-0.16) 
-0.68** -0.48 
(-1.91) (-1.16) 
32 25 
0.45 0.42 
7.28 5.34 
Note: t-statistics are shown in brackets.* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%. 
Openness to trade is also a significant factor and with a negative sign, 
confirming the hypothesis that external factors tend to put 'positive' 
pressure on governments. The British legal system is also a significant 
factor. 
When only SDS are considered (columns (3) and (4)), the level of 
development remains significant, although less so than in the larger 
sample. Openness seems to be less important as one compares across 
similar specifications, and the same applies to the British legal system. 
One needs to be careful not to overstate these results, however, given 
the relatively small sample size for the SDS sub-sample. Future 
investigations should be able to confirm these results. Overall, based on 
the results reported here, there does not seem to be a significant difference 
between the determinants of governance in SDS and in developing 
countries. 
The results in Table 2 do not change significantly when the World Bank 
data on governance is considered (results not shown here), not 
surprisingly given its high correlation with the CIFP governance 
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indicator. In order to further investigate the hypothesis regarding 
differences in the determinants of governance between SOS and other 
countries, we conducted F-tests (Chow tests) on the sample of SOS versus 
the sample of developing countries excluding SOS. The computed F 
statistics did not exceed the critical F values at the chosen levels of 
significance and we could not, therefore, reject the hypothesis that the 
regressions are the same. This again confirms that there is not a significant 
difference between the determinants of governance in SOS and in other 
developing countries. 
5. Conclusions 
Through a survey of the literature and quantitative analysis, we have traced 
the theoretical and empirical characteristics that distinguish small 
developing states from their larger counterparts with respect to 
governance. Our findings from the empirical analysis are that the level of 
development, trade openness and the British legal system are important 
determinants of governance in SOS, with the level of development being 
the most important factor. We also found that there is not a significant 
difference between the determinants of governance in SOS and the other 
developing countries, whereas SOS tend to be unique in many other ways 
(see Carment et al., 2006). Future analyses that exploit the temporal (as 
well as cross-sectional) aspects of the issue, that is, using panel data, thus 
increasing the sample size, should be enlightening in this regard. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that lagged values of the independent 
variables have been used to reduce the likelihood of endogeneity, income 
per capita is normally highly correlated with itself over time, implying 
that endogeneity may still be present and bias the results. Obviously, the 
way to deal with this problem would be to use instrumental variable 
estimation, something which we leave for future research. 
There is the need for further research to build on the insights generated 
in Carment et al. (2006), which focused on inherent structural features 
of small states that cause instability and this present chapter which 
focuses on governance. As mentioned in the latter, we have found that 
our governance (and fragility) indices are strongly correlated with the 
Briguglio et al.' s Resilience Index. A next step would be to disaggregate 
these indices to find out where exactly they converge and diverge. One 
such method would be to profile specific countries, using a breakdown 
of the individual composites to determine points of divergence. In this 
way, we will be better situated to explain the conditions under which 
an economically resilient state is likely to experience good governance 
and when it is not. 
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Appendixl 
Small Developing States (SDS) 
Andorra 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belize 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Grenada 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Iceland 
Jamaica 
Kiribati 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Maldives 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Monaco 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Qatar 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Timor-Leste 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Vanuatu 
Note: The list above includes small developing states (SDS), small island developing states 
(SIDS) and countries with a population of 1.5 million or less, for which data were available. 
239 
Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience 
Appendix2 
Correlation Matrix of the CIFP Fragility Index, the Governance 
Index and Briguglio's Vulnerability and Resilience Indices 
G F R v c 
Governance (G) 1.00 
FS Index (F) 0.95 1.00 
Resilience (R) -0.84 -0.88 1.00 
Vulnerability (V) 0.06 0.10 -0.07 1.00 
Combined ( C) 0.60 0.66 -0.71 0.75 1.00 
(N=87) 
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Appendix3 
List of Clusters and Indicators in the CIFP Governance Index 
1. Democratic Participalion 
Checks and Balances (World Bank Database of Political Indicators, Index 1-5) 
Degree of Party Dominance (WB DPI, ratio of opposition to govt members) 
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians (WB WDI) 
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, Index, -10-10) 
Executive Constraints (Polity IV, Index, 1-7) 
2. Government and Market Efficiency 
Economic Growth: Percentage of GDP (WB WDI) 
Economic Size: Relative, GDP per capita (WB WDI) 
Economic Size: Total, GDP (WB WDI) 
External Debt: Percentage of GNI (WB WDI) 
Ease of Doing Business: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Starting a Business: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Protecting Investors (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Trading Across Borders: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Closing a Business: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Economic Freedom: (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100) 
Savings Level: (WB WDI, Gross Domestic as a % of GDP) 
Foreign Investment Freedom: (Heritage Foundation, Index, 0-100) 
Intellectual Property: (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10) 
Inveshnent Climate: Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5) 
Enforcing Contracts: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Dealing with Licences: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Registering Property: (WB Ease of Doing Business, Global Rank) 
Enrolment Rates: (UNESCO, Gross enrolment ratio) 
Health Infrastructure: Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB WDI) 
Access to Improved Water: (WB WDI, percentage of pop.) 
Government Effectiveness: (WB Governance Matters, Deviation from Mean) 
FDI: percentage of GDP (WB WDI) 
Foreign Aid: Percentage of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI) 
Inequality: CINI Coefficient (WB WDI) 
Trade Balance: percentage of GDP (WB WDI) 
Unemployment: (WB, Percentage) 
Paying Taxes: (WB Doing Business, Global Rank) 
3. Accountability 
Corruption: (WB GM, Deviation from Mean) 
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making: (WB GM, Deviation from Mean) 
Freedom of the Press: (FH, Index, 0-100) 
4. Human Rights 
Restrictions on Civil T .ihPrliPs: (FH, Index, 1-7) 
Resh·ictions on Political Rights: (FH, 1-7) 
Human Rights: Empowerment: (CIRI, Index, 0-10) 
Human Rights: Physical Integrity: (CIRI, Index, 0-10) 
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5. Political Stability and Violence 
Permanence of Regime Type: (Polity N, Years since Regime Change) 
Informal Economy: Black Market: (Heritage Foundation, 1-5) 
Conflict intensity: (Uppsala PRIO, Number of Conflict-related Deaths) 
Dependence on External Military Support: (Fund for Peace, 1-10) 
Military Expenditure: Percentage of GDP: (WDI) 
Political Stability: (WB GM, Deviation from Mean) 
Refugees Produced: (WB WDI) 
Terrorism: Number of fatalities: (US NCTC, Number of Fatalities) 
Terrorism: Number of Incidents: (US NCTC, Number of Incidents) 
6. Rule of Law 
Police, Law and Ciiminality: (WB GM, Deviation from Global Mean) 
Prison Population Rate: (International Centre for Prison Studies, per 100,000 pop.) 
Prison Occupancy Level: (ICPS, Percentage of Official Capacity) 
Number of Political Prisoners: (CIRI, Index, 0-2) 
Judicial Independence: (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10) 
Impartial Courts: (Fraser Institute, Index, 0-10) 
Methodological note: In calculating the CIFP index, each cluster is weighted equally. 
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